Long time readers know that around 2010 I was a Facebook skeptic. I would periodically check Google Trends results, and post them, to illustrate that the phase of exponential growth was ending (you saw that in user base too). The Social Network film also seemed to herald the top of the cultural influence of Facebook. Well, whatever the search engine terms are, as a matter of business viability it seems that I was wrong, Facebook has not peaked. The fact that I stopped talking about Facebook is a clue to that, since I would no doubt be posting my vindication if I had been right. But I thought it that admitting I was wrong in public might be useful, in particular since others are.
I’ve expressed a little disappointment in a book I recently read, Azar Gat’s Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism. There are two primary reasons for this. Nations simply does not measure up to his previous work, War and Human Civilization. But that is perhaps not a fair assessment, since War and Human Civilization is quite possibly Gat’s magnum opus. A second issue is that the core assertion in Nations is quite modest, and not entirely at variance with conventional intuitions. Basically, Gat is refuting a modernist view, which has arguably gone from being revisionist to normative, that the concept and execution of a nation is a historically contingent construction of early modern Europe, and more precisely Revolutionary France of the 1790s. This is not an unfounded characterization of what the default position for many is, I myself have parroted the idea that the nation-state was “invented” by the French in the 1790s. This may be a vulgarization, but I’ve heard others express the same sentiment in the years since I first encountered this thesis in high school. It’s one of those “fun counter-intuitive facts” which has the beauty of simplicity, and the drawback of almost certainly being false on the face of it.
But note that I qualified the nation-state, rather than nation unadorned. When properly qualified and delineated one can perhaps defend the empirical validity of the idea that something unique emerged in early modern Europe after the Peace of Westphalia, and culminating in the Congress of Vienna. The problem is that the model being presented is usually not couched in modest terms. In hindsight the idea that nationalism is an invention of early modern Europe, and Revolutionary France, has as much plausibility as the idea that the Troubadours of the Provence invented romantic love. Yes, there are particular motifs and forms in the idea of love as it is culturally practiced in much of the world which may have its roots in this period and place, but I think it is totally misleading to assert that “love” is a cultural invention of the medieval West, as a common vulgarization goes.* Rather, love has a deep cognitive and evolutionary basis in our lineage, and manifests in a variety of ways in different social contexts. There isn’t a part of the brain which is our “love region,” rather, it is an emotion which synthesizes basic elements of human nature. It is not particularly surprising that romantic love is going to be more salient in an individualist society with consumer surplus, but that does not mean that subsistence level peasants lack the basic cognitive facilities because they had not been properly enculturated.**
Obviously there are differences between the phenomena of love and nationhood. The latter is a much more ‘high level’ phenomenon in terms of social complexity. Nationhood can not be understood except in the context of aggregates, while love is a phenomenon that can play out in dyads.*** Gat’s thesis is that given particular conditions nations are a primal unit of organization for humans. Those conditions obviously include a rate of primary economic productivity and elaborated social complexity which can support supra-tribal political units. Notice here that a state as we understand it is not necessary; the Greeks of the classical period were a nation, but they lacked a state. Nations supports Gat’s thesis with a literal flood of historical facts. Much of this is interesting. But, it presupposes that the readership can actually judge the selection and veracity of said facts. I can, because I know a lot of history. But I suspect that for readers with a weaker historical knowledge base a book of half its length would have sufficed. Second, throughout the narrative Gat refers to the modernist scholars who he is refuting extensively, but repeatedly suggests that even they don’t subscribe to the extremist caricatures of the origins and invention of nationhood (at least implicitly).
To state it in extremely plain language Nations argues that nations which are persistent have coherent cultural cores, which are more robust than states. To me this seems uncontroversial and obvious, but I do know that plenty of people find this surprising. Additionally, there is the problem that many lack the nuance to understand what this does, and doesn’t, mean. Consider for example the Byzantine Empire. As an empire one can immediately infer that it was multicultural, in that multiple nations were under its rule. It is a curiosity to note that until its last the Byzantines considered themselves Romans, and thought of their empire as the Roman Empire. Notwithstanding this peculiarity from the middle of the 7th century the core cultural identity of the Byzantine Empire was that of Greek speaking Christians. That Christianity varied in theology (e.g., see Monothelitism), but those within the Byzantine Empire and outside of it who adhered that position were consider orthodox and part of the imperial party.**** Additionally, Greek was obviously the language of the elite. In the classical Byzantine period between 650 and 1100 most of the emperors had ethnic origins which were clearly not Greek (e.g., Syrian and Armenian), and likely not orthodox (since certain ethnicities, such as Armenians, had national churches at variance with Byzantine orthodoxy). But nevertheless these individuals assimilated to the ethno-cultural identity which was hegemonic throughout the history of the Byzantine Empire.
Gat’s idea about nationhood is multi-textured, and gives due respect to the fact that the ancients held multiple ideas interleaved in their own minds. Nations were generally conceived in a manner which presupposed common descent and biological unity. That is, the population were descended from legendary founders. And yet they could also acknowledge composite origins. For example, the Romans were a Latin people, but they also had Sabine antecedents at the founding, including some of their most famous patrician families, such as the Claudii. Though the common Latin core persisted down to the fall of the Empire, it was integrative and assimilative. The Roman Empire was multicultural, but it was ruled by a Latin speaking elite. Gat points out that by the 5th century in much of the Roman Empire local languages and identities were fading, so that what had been an core ethno-cultural group was transforming into a majoritarian nation. The local populations conquered by Germanic tribes referred to themselves as “Romans,” in contrast to their rulers. And this illustrates the common sense model which is exposited in Gat’s work, nationality emerges and coalesces organically from loyalties and allegiances at a lower order of organization, and extends gradually upward and outward. The stylized contrast is the idea that nationhood is extruded ex nihilo from the minds of ruling elites in a specific period and place.
All of this is at the front of my mind while reading what’s going in the news right now. Consider two pieces in The New York Times, In a Syrian City, ISIS Puts Its Vision Into Practice and Report Cites ‘Aggressive’ Islamic Push in British City’s Schools. From the first piece:
…The traffic police are based in the First Shariah High School. Raqqa’s Credit Bank is now the tax authority, where employees collect $20 every two months from shop owners for electricity, water and security. Many said that they received official receipts stamped with the ISIS logo and that the fees were less than they used to pay in bribes to Mr. Assad’s government.
“I feel like I am dealing with a respected state, not thugs,” said a Raqqa goldsmith in his small shop as a woman shopped for gold pieces with cash sent from abroad by her husband.
From everything we read it seems that a shockingly high proportion of the front line troops of the Islamic State are psychopaths. By this, I don’t mean that they are normal people caught up in conforming to a cruel system, but that they are literally mentally unstable violent individuals. The fact that the Islamic State can organize a less venal system of political order than what came before in regions under its rule despite the human capital it has to work with tells you something both about the Islamic State and its enemies. It is cliche to suggest that the “nation-states” of the Middle East are all artificial kleptocracies derived from the imaginations of Europeans. What is less palatable is to admit that the Islamic State is presenting a positive vision which can impose order upon its subjects as well its less than mentally normal foot soldiers. I don’t think this is scalable or sustainable, but it is something we have to admit as truth. The Islamic State has Asabiyyah.
The second article is about the fears over Islamic fundamentalism taking over state sponsored faith schools in Britain. Here the back-story is that Britain has long mixed state and religion, ergo, education and religion. So with a large Muslim minority, and in some regions a majority, it is reasonable to expect that Islamic faith schools would emerge. The problem is that modern Britain also demands these schools adhere to particular Western liberal norms. There are debates aired within the article whether the British government’s reports on Islamic fundamentalism within these specific schools are exaggerated or not. That’s not my focus or concern in this post. Rather:
One public high school at the heart of the Trojan Horse controversy, Park View Academy, was ranked as one of the worst schools in Birmingham in the 1990s, with most students failing their final exams. But by 2012 it had received top marks from school inspectors, and nearly four in every five of its students now go on to university.
The dominant element in the Muslim population in the United Kingdom is from Pakistan, with the majority overall being from South Asia. These Muslims are likely Europe’s most socially conservative, and the dominant British ethos of multiculturalism is such that they are given free rein to develop their own identity (which is something somewhat different from that of their South Asian lands of origin). The fact that “British nationals” are prominent in overseas jihadi movements should be a tell that a substantial element within this population has an identification with worldwide Islam that is inimical to their integration into broader British society, which is post-Christian and liberal. Would it be entirely surprising if a population which has a conservative Muslim ethos would have more “buy in” to public education if they felt that that education reflected their deeply held values?
The New York Times piece quotes the British education secretary as saying ‘These people had “a restricted and narrow interpretation of their faith,” and had failed to promote fundamental British values and to challenge.’ Two points. First, where does the British education secretary get off critiquing how British Muslims interpret their faith when there’s been generations of hands off multiculturalism? As a person of no faith I don’t particularly privilege faith in any way, but Western liberals have been playing an inchoate game for several generations about the nature of religious liberty. There is no free lunch. If religious liberty is a fundamental right, then you should expect some religious people to cry foul when you constrain that right. Second, what exactly are British values? Tolerance, diversity, and respect for the Queen? British Muslims isolated in their ethnic ghettos have a clear and crisp voice from conservative and fundamentalist Islamic theorists in terms of what their appropriate standards of behavior and belief should be. I don’t see any such clarity from the British state, so as a matter of description it is entirely predictable that bringing a large population with such a different historical experience would result in a culture clash.
The problem is that Western liberals want to have their cake and eat it too. They want to tolerate diversity, but that diversity is constrained by the fact that their own vision of what is a “fundamental human right” is peculiarly isomorphic with the social consensus of their societies’ elites at a particular time and point. The current focus on LGBT rights is perfectly illustrative of this dynamic. Social and political thinkers who have only recently “evolved” on this issue, within the last 20 years, now wish to promote tolerance for LGBT individuals in a world where broad swaths reject that proposition. The reality is that this is Western cultural imperialism. Of the humane and good sort, just as the British campaign against suttee, but that is what it is. People whose ethos is non-Western see clearly that this is the specific and historically contingent ethos of a Western global elite, while Western thought leaders continue to speak of “universal human rights,” out of time and history, eternal.
Human social existence is thick. It is multi-textured and threaded with diverse strands, some at cross-purposes. When we attempt to model this complexity with thin abstract stylized models, we often fail. In the 19th and early 20th centuries a particular sort of biological model arose of nationality which conceived of the English and German races, where nations were inevitable and primordial expressions of genetic relatedness. After World War II such views fell into disrepute, and ideas of civic nationalism arose which seemed to presume that the nation-state could arise out of the will of elites within a single generation. Both of these are thin models which fail to predict the organic waxing and waning of nations, because they elide causal complexity. With simple models in hand it is hard to understand history and current events, because human behavior can confound in its riotous unpredictably. There are no short cuts here. The maxim to make models as complex as needs be, but no more, is easier to follow in the physical sciences where the models are actually not that complex!
* There are other non-Western candidates proffered for the inventors of love, so this need not be an issue of Eurocentrism.
** Even if romantic love did not loom large in the life of a peasant family in medieval Germany, to give an example, love as a generalized emotion surely existed between mother and child, and so on. I doubt the cognitive competencies here are separable, so humans likely retain a capacity for romantic love even if it is not culturally prominent.
*** Or in the case of narcissists, one suffices.
**** Ergo, even in Muslim lands those Christians who adhered to the Byzantine formula were “Melkites”, “imperial.”
Schizophrenia is a highly heritable disorder. Genetic risk is conferred by a large number of alleles, including common alleles of small effect that might be detected by genome-wide association studies. Here we report a multi-stage schizophrenia genome-wide association study of up to 36,989 cases and 113,075 controls. We identify 128 independent associations spanning 108 conservatively defined loci that meet genome-wide significance, 83 of which have not been previously reported. Associations were enriched among genes expressed in brain, providing biological plausibility for the findings. Many findings have the potential to provide entirely new insights into aetiology, but associations at DRD2 and several genes involved in glutamatergic neurotransmission highlight molecules of known and potential therapeutic relevance to schizophrenia, and are consistent with leading pathophysiological hypotheses. Independent of genes expressed in brain, associations were enriched among genes expressed in tissues that have important roles in immunity, providing support for the speculated link between the immune system and schizophrenia.
This publication is accompanied by a massive grant to the Broad Institute for the purposes of making discoveries in the field of psychiatric genomics. Eric Lander is a brilliant scientist, but boy can he bring in the dollars. Psychiatric genetics has been around for a while, from the days of linkage studies to association analysis. But it’s been plagued by inability to replicate positive findings, strongly suggestive of issues of sample sizes too small to have the power to answer the questions being posed robustly. The people associated with the Broad Institute are smart. Hopefully they don’t have to worry about adding a line to their CVs with studies they’re not totally sure of. With these sorts of sample sizes there is a chance that they can brute force their way past some of the expected problems of finding genuine novel genetic associations when a trait his highly polygenic.
Finally, perhaps with some of the $650 million allocated to this research they could publish in journals that are open access or pay Nature/Science/Cell to have them open access? If you look at the author list it’s enormous. These projects in the future are going to involve many different research groups, and a substantial portion of peoples’ careers. It is probably optimal that this research is widely distributed partly to stimulate interest from those who are thinking about a career in science.
Addendum: I can see why they don’t call it ‘psycho-genomics.’ But it would be fun.
What to think if you are a “well informed” person when the information changes so often and quickly? Melinda Wenner Moyer’s article in Aeon, Against Grain, is a good place to start. She observes:
In the midst of all the claims and counterclaims, there is a single clear piece of common ground. Experts of every stripe ask dieters to avoid refined sugars and grains. ‘Losing body weight on a plant-based diet is much less likely to occur if the diet includes too many refined carbohydrates,’ writes Cornell’s T. Colin Campbell in his book, The China Study, based in part on his Cornell-Oxford-China study research. Esselstyn instructs his dieters to consume only whole-grain products and avoid fruit juice. And McDougall urges his readers to eat complex carbohydrates instead of refined sugars and flours.
So where does all this leave us, other than confused and wondering if we should stop eating cupcakes? On the health side, the science does collectively suggest, but not prove, that a calorie is not always just a calorie, and that carbohydrates – particularly refined ones – might have unique metabolic effects that increase risk for chronic disease. Indeed, the notion that sugar and refined carbs are dangerous seems to be the one point on which nutrition scientists at either end of the carb-fat spectrum agree. I suspect that my weight-loss success a decade ago had something to do with the fact that, by cutting out wheat, I was replacing some refined carbohydrates with other macronutrients.
The problem here is what Jim Manzi in Uncontrolled terms “high causal density.” The most famous researchers, such as Dean Ornish and Robert Atkins, tend to present you with one-size-fits-all strident solutions. But the fact is that there are people who remain thin, who do not exercise, and consume processed carb and sugar.* I know them, and you probably know them. There are many factors which go into the end product of a person’s physical appearance and overall morbidity risk. On an aggregate scale of societies a few significant variables changing can result in enormous differences in outcomes, but people need to see efficacy on the individual level, and the causal signals can be confusing (in particular if efficacy varies from person to person for the same regime!).
A bigger issue has been institutional health’s monomaniacal focus on fat and a few biomarkers has left many not trusting scientific recommendations. That focus is shifting, as science does update. Unfortunately the generation of new robust inferences is noisy and prone to dead ends in domains of high causal density. This is not always the case in public health. It turns out that the model of germ theory is not too subtle; it describes the world in pretty uncomplicated terms. Similarly, why and how vaccines work is tractable because the etiology of how you get polio is much easier to tackle than how you get type 2 diabetes. In all likelihood there are many ways to get type 2 diabetes, and multiple factors impact different people at different weights (e.g., there are people with a greater genetic disposition to type 2 diabetes given the same exercise and nutritional regimes, though one might be able to explain this with something like the nature of fat deposition).
This reality of science as a messy and iterative process is obvious to anyone who practices science. A year ago I had a conversation with a friend who happens to be a professor of biology at a university, and we were talking about the problems with convincing the public about the efficacy of vaccination. He admitted that he had a bit of guilt in this area because when it came to his own health he took a very critically-rational perspective as to what his physicians told him. As someone who was aware of the protean nature of scientific literature he had no great confidence that the recommendations from on high were definitive or the “final answer.” Another friend who is a medical doctor did admit to me that for him patients who had a good science background were a pleasure to work with because for them healthcare was a collaborative process in which they were active participants, instead of being recipients of his commands ex cathedra. This reality is why I am somewhat uncomfortable with the “Because Science” meme. It attributes to science almost Solomonic powers of judgment, and in actuality is wielded to reinforce the prior conceptions of interlocutors.
Where does that leave us? Describing a problem is not a solution, and due to the nature of the reality here there isn’t an easy answer. But it does imply to me that we should be cautious about engineering aspects of human life when the scientific basis for that engineering is less than certain. The war on fat and salt over the past few generations have been due to putting science forward as the basis of policy which turned out to not be robust. In the case of salt the establishment has even done an about face, “the government says there is no good reason based on health outcomes for many Americans to drive their sodium consumption down to the very low levels recommended in national dietary guidelines.” Salt tastes good, so one can imagine just how much utility was left on the table because people changed their diet to become more insipid. Policies have consequences.
Increasingly new way of thinking about diet has been to focus less on the latest science, and fall back on cultural culinary history. “Eat like your grandmother cooked” is trendy advice proffered by influential writers such as Mark Bittman and Michael Pollan. But by removing heavily processed foods it might be a major upgrade from modern diets, which are designed to sustain the profits of the food industry, not our own health (that’s a negative externality, the cost of which they don’t have to eat). Whether you go mostly plant-based or carnivorous, you’re probably going to be fitter in either direction, even if one is superior to the other at the end of the day.** Instead of deduction from what we know, anengineering an appropriate nutritional outcome, in the best course of action in the near future is probably “hipster nutrition.” Artisan hand-crafted diets which look back to the past, though in a non-ironic fashion, might be the best way to go because they’re the outcome of hundreds of years of innovation and experimentation. If you don’t have randomized control trials, go with the next best thing. History.
* Whether they are healthy is a different question obviously.
** One issue is that the different options might be superior for different people.
Almost done with Azar Gat’s Nations. But I’m violating my preference for reading books serially by simultaneously going through Matthew Stewart’s Nature’s God: The Heretical Origins of the American Republic. It’s actually a hardcover book, as Stewart sent me a review copy. That makes it feel a little different when it comes to switching between Nations and Nature’s God. I’ve been a fan of Stewart’s books for a while, and did a 10 questions with him in 2006. There’s a lot in this book that I knew from more conventional history about the founding (see Jay Winik’s Great Upheaval), but I’m enjoying the interleaving of ancient philosophy. Stewart does a great of intellectual detective work from what I can tell. If you don’t know much about philosophy, but are curious to peruse a non-academic survey, the author’s previous work The Truth About Everything: An Irreverent History of Philosophy will be worth it.
Also, I’ve been a little disappointed by Nations. It’s good, but not nearly at the same level as War and Human Civilization. In that book the author had greater command of the material and clarity of presentation, so he didn’t try to keep hitting you over with the same point over and over. I’d still recommend the book, but readers should focus on the factual yield rather than the coherent thesis, since the basics of the latter are obvious early on.
For me the most interesting point is the argument that across mammals (and perhaps other vertebrates!) the disruption of development is due singularly to changes in neural crest cells, but on the genetic level the evolutionary process is polygenic and diverse. In other words the developmental pathway will exhibit similarities, ergo, similar correlated side effect traits. But the genetic architecture of the change across species may vary, because there are many genes which are effected by the phenotypic target of selection. Another way to state this is that there is no gene for domestication in the lineages under consideration, but rather many genes which have significant, but not overwhelming, effect. Of course there’s polygenic, and then there’s polygenic. One of the common side effects of domestication is depigmentation of the pelage of mammals, but this is one case where the number of genes effecting the trait is relatively low, on the order of ten genes account for more than half the variation. In contrast you have polygenic traits like height where you’re lucky to find one locus which can explain one percent of the variation. If domestication is like the latter then the role of standing variation in the evolutionary story is going to be large, nearly total. In contrast if pigmentation is representative than classical selection on new mutations of large effect unique to particular lineages may still be important. Not to be lame, but the answer is probably going to be in the middle, on average.
Second, there are broader questions about contingency, the genetic architecture of salient traits, and selection as a driver for adaptation, which come to mind after reading this paper. It seems hard to deny that if you constrain the phylogenetic space enough then there are many instances where evolutionary forces will basically result in broadly similar phenotypic and genetic outcomes. Though there are some differences in traits and genetic variations, there is a great deal of overlap across mammalian taxa which have been targeted by artificial selection. Though the authors don’t address this directly it, seems clear that many of the phenomena which revolve around domestication also apply to humans. If they do, and if “domestication” occurs through gradual selection upon standing variation, then the search for the gene which makes us uniquely human (e.g., “the language gene”) may be futile. Rather than a gene, our humanity may have emerged out of gradual change as the underlying frequency of alleles is shifted. This is not a sexy answer which will result in genomic fame for a researcher who discovers the gene-which-makes-us-human. Finally, there is the issue where we bracket artificial selection and domestication as if they are unique processes which derive from human agency. My own position is that though for semantic purposes we may speak of ‘artificial selection’,’ sexual selection’, and ‘natural selection,’ there’s really no fundamental difference at the root for these phenomena. Selection is selection, and the rest is commentary. To me that implies that attempting to understanding domestication may actually allow us to understand evolution more broadly (and Charles Darwin would agree with that point I suspect).
But there is another use of jargon, and that is to impress, intimidate, and signal that you are one of the initiates. Ideally jargon should facilitate faster and more transparent communication among specialists in a given topic. But in some cases jargon becomes a tool for intra-group argument, posturing, and maneuvering. It’s a stylistic flourish which connotes, rather than a substantive pointer which denotes. For example, I’ve been a bystander to arguments among conservative Christians who debate whether a particular political position is “glorifying Christ.” I have no clear idea what “glorifying Christ” means, but all the principals to the argument agree that it is a good thing, so it seems to me that this sort of utilization of the term in is mostly tactical and stylistic.
Recently I’ve been noticing a similar phenomenon in online discussions to which I’m am observer. Many on the cultural Left have started to engage in a seepage of jargon from critical theory into political arguments. The problem here is that politics is a public discussion, not discourse among specialists, so falling back on jargon narrows the horizons of engagement. To me the proliferation of terms such as ‘cultural appropriation’, as if everyone knows what that means (and if you don’t, your opinion is irrelevant), signals that the discussants are attempting to score points in their own social and political circles. Similarly, when Neoreactionaries using terms like the Cathedral they’re closing off the conversation to outsiders, and creating a group with initiate-like dynamics. Often American conservatives will talk about “liberty” and “freedom” in a manner which is more symbolic than literal (most people who are not conservatives also think liberty and freedom are good things). And libertarians have their own internal group language which points to divisions which are perceived to be significant within their own circles, but are totally opaque to outsiders.
The proliferation of this tendency across the political spectrum argues that our society is fracturing in a deep manner, as shared public lexicon is less important than winning internal battles within each faction. To some extent I think it also correlates with the decline in arguments over material-economic concerns, and the rise of cultural politics. Yes, there are populist noises across the political spectrum, but the status quo is rarely altered when it comes our economic politics today. For the social elites the cultural battles is what concerns them.
My household has three Kindle Fire tablets (two of them HD). Obviously they are used for things besides reading books, but the main reason for their purchase was as text delivery devices. If I an extra house to store physical books and a manservant of some sort to manage the collection, I would be very happy with “dead tree.” I had a professor years ago who admitted he had an extra house which he ended up filling with his enormous book collection, to the annoyance of his wife. I can’t imagine being in that situation, but my “book habit” was getting out of control by the middle years of the 2000s. Moving was starting to become a major chore which I dreaded because of the boxes of books. And I don’t miss lugging around large numbers of books when I’m going on a road trip. I am well aware that there are unintended downsides to signing on to the e-book revolution, and Amazon in particular. But the convenience factor is just too high. And yes, I’m a pretty big user of Amazon Prime; I never liked physical shopping.
So I was curious when Amazon launched a subscription book service. The New York Times reviews the pro’s and con’s, Amazon Unveils E-Book Subscription Service, With Some Notable Absences. Some people are calling it a glorified library card. If that was the case I would probably sign up. But looking at the collection of books I don’t see many recent academic press publications, which is the largest proportion of my reading. So as it it happens it isn’t a glorified library card. So I’m not signing up, even though the price point isn’t high at all.
The above figure is from Population and genomic lessons from genetic analysis of two Indian populations. What you see here is that two Indian Hindu populations from the north and south of the subcontinent have clearly elevated stretches of genomic homozygosity in comparison to the classic Northwest European population of whites from Utah. This is interesting because the social practices of the two groups here are quite different. Some South Indian Hindus practice consanguineous marriage; e.g., first cousins or uncle-niece. This is evident in some individuals in the data set. But North Indian Hindus traditionally enforce significant exogamy among relations via the gotra system and seeking partners outside natal villages. And yet the genomic evidence indicates a relatively small effective population. That’s because though North Indian Hindus practice exogamy on the scale of families, they nevertheless usually marry within a local caste. The effect of this genomically was one of the less trumpeted findings of the 2009 paper Reconstructing Indian Population History. India may have a very large population, but the genealogical history of many of its people is sharply delimited. This recent paper uses exomes, and I think clinches the finding.
Second, two data sets that I stumbled upon in case you don’t know which are in VCF and phased Beagle format (though the newest release of Beagle uses VCF anyhow):
Singapore Sequencing Malay, 100 Malays.
Singapore Sequencing Indian. 36 individuals. Mostly South Indian Tamil.
The New York Times has a very long story about the nation of Qatar’s quest for soccer excellent. Reading the story was depressing. Is this what humanity has come to? There’s a lot of bellyaching about science in the Muslim world, but look no further than the priorities of the oil rich Gulf states. Qatar is going to spend $200 billion over a 10 year period on amenities for soccer because it is hosting the World Cup in 2022. Yes, the World Cup is a very big deal. But did you know that NASA’s budget for 2012 was less than 20 billion dollars. In other words Qatar could create its own rival to NASA if it wanted. But why would they?
This isn’t a plea for space science. But, it is an argument that human outcomes are contingent on human values. In the 19th century men of leisure such as Charles Darwin were scientists, because they could be. Today we have some men of wealth, such as Elon Musk, attempting to do great things (and likely failing, because bold ventures generally do fail). But by and large the priorities of plutocrats are more pedestrian. Posterity shall be the judge.
By now you may have read The New York Times story, How Do You Get to Carnegie Hall? Talent. It’s based on a meta-analysis, Deliberate Practice and Performance in Music, Games, Sports, Education, and Professions. Obviously this finding is a rebuke to the vulgarization of the “10,000 hour rule” which was popularized after Malcolm Gladwell published Outliers: The Story of Success. There has been a veritable industry attacking and tearing down Gladwell. It’s just too easy. But nevertheless Gladwell is laughing all the way to the bank. He sells orders of magnitude more than his critics.
Why? As Steve Sailer notes people want “hard and fast” rules for human accomplishment. There’s two problems here. First, if a rule was hard & fast, and therefore could be implemented on a wide basis, then there wouldn’t be any advantage to any particular person. For example, if you could become a chess master by investing 10,000 hours of training, then you’d have many, many “chess masters.” All of a sudden being a chess master, by definition superior to other players, would not be predicted by the 10,000 hour investment.
Second, rather than getting into the details of what proportion of the variation in outcomes is responsible to genes vs. environment, the reality is that in many traits of interest for humans at the extreme excellent end of the spectrum there are many factors at work. And, much of basis for success is not reproducible, and can be chalked up to randomness (at least from our perspective). When people talking about the “environmental component” of variation one often presumes that this is the malleable/controllable aspect, but often a lot of random variation is collapsed into this fraction. Just because it’s genetic doesn’t mean we know the basis or the sequence of causal events which lead to an outcome.
Consider professional sports. This a field where the individuals are many standard deviations from the norm, and usually success is a combination of many factors, size, strength, speed, work ethic, etc. Even though having a parent who is a professional athlete increases your chance greatly of becoming a professional athlete (by orders of magnitude), most children of professional athletes do not have the talent to become professional athletes themselves. Michael Jordan’s sons were no better than college players of no particular distinction. And this is arguably the greatest basketball player of all time (or one of the greatest along with Wilt Chamberlain). It shows the limitations of prediction on an individual level when you are pushing the threshold of virtuosity to a very high setting.* Of course, that does not mean that grit and hard work can’t make someone a varsity basketball player. All things seem more reasonable when kept in perspective, but that doesn’t sell books or get you a gig at The New Yorker.
* Of course one might argue that Jordan should have selected a suitably athletic spouse. Interestingly Kobe Bryant has professional basketball players on both sides of the family.
Sad news, Cricket, who starred in so many posts on this blog, is no longer with us. She wandered in off the street in September of 2004. She was fixed and did not look like a long-time stray at all, so we suspect she was either lost or abandoned. In any case, she had a great nearly 10 year run with our family. The end came very quickly and was a shock to all of us.
In response to one of my posts someone characterizes a historian as having stated that “the Christianization of Europe as a culturally created event that needn’t have occurred.” The “standard model” in history (which has detractors*) is that in the 390s the Western Roman Empire underwent a traditionalist pagan religious-cultural revival, snuffed out by Theodosius the Great victory at Frigidus. But what if Arbogast had won? This might present us with an alternative history where paganism revives, and Christianity is reduced to a sect among sects. Some have made the case that this is in fact what occurred in China in the 9th century to Buddhism. Though Buddhism persisted as a religion in China, it no longer threatened to absorb the Chinese elite as partners a project of cultural hegemony. The fall of Buddhism as the religion of the elite in the 9th century led to the rise of Neo-Confucianism, which in various forms dominated Chinese high culture up to the fall of the Manchu dynasty (in their capacity as non-Chinese potentates the Manchus did patronize Tibetan Buddhism).
And this fact gives us insight I think into the nature and fundamental basis of Christianization in Europe, and elsewhere. The book The Barbarian Conversion tells the story of the Christianization of the polities of northern Europe after the fall of Rome, the transformation of pagan tribal domains into Christian proto-nation-states. But one need not specify anything particular to Christianity, because many of the same dynamics which transformed the pagan tribal federations of northern Europe could also apply to Asia in relation to Buddhism. The conversion to Christianity in northern Europe was often halting, with traditionalist reactions sometimes turning violent. The same phenomenon also accompanied Buddhism’s arrival in Tibet and Japan.
In China and India Buddhism ultimately did not capture the culture in a way that occurred in Burma or Tibet. But the indigenous response illustrates that the clock could never be rolled back in a cultural sense. Neo-Confucianism and Puranic Hinduism were fundamentally different from the variants of Confucianism and Hinduism which Buddhism had confronted and often marginalized. The native, older, traditions were transmuted into something different by the confrontation with Buddhism. If Christianity had been dethroned from its role at the center of the state in the late 4th century, then almost certain Roman traditionalism would have absorbed many of the ideological and ritual innovations of Christianity in relation to the older forms of religious worship. To some extent one can argue that the religious ferment in 6th century Iran, as Zoroastrianism was buffeted by reformist and revolutionary movements, illustrates exactly this impact of Christianity in late antiquity. The Persians at various times flirted with Christianity in various forms (Mesopotamia under Persian rule had very few Zoroastrians, and was likely majority Christianity), but settled on their primal religion. If the Arabs an Islam had not halted the process I suspect that Christian competition and cultural influence would have modulated Zoroastrianism, just as Buddhism reshaped Confucianism and Hinduism.
The broader point is that human cultural evolution is not totally contingent, but seems to fall into broad convergent patterns. All of the world’s “higher religions” exhibit broad similarities (e.g., synthesizing ritual, ethics, and metaphysics). Beginning with the Axial Age, the process of religious innovation seems to have ended a little over one thousand years later with the rise of Islam. One can think of this process as cultural ‘selective sweeps’ across a terrain rich with expansionary opportunities. But once the space was filled by higher religions one saw a sort of cultural equilibrium attained.
* Revisionist scholars who believe that the ‘pagan revival’ has been overblown or exaggerated.
Some recent research has just been published with the title Chimpanzee Intelligence Is Heritable. My first thought honestly was “No shit? Of course.” My friend Jason Goldman has already done a very good write up at io9 if you want read about it and don’t have access to the paper. In commenting on the results Jason notes (and I agree with the general thrust here):
That isn’t a particularly surprising or novel statement on its own [that chimpanzee intelligence is heritable -Razib]. We already knew that genes have an important job when it comes to intelligence and cognition. But what’s useful is that we can assume chimpanzee intelligence isn’t influenced by factors like socioeconomic status, the quality of their school districts, or any of the dozens of other variables, both obvious and subtle, that influence human development. That means we can examine the “genetic” side of their intelligence more easily.
Of course chimpanzees vary in intelligence, and, that variation has a genetic component. Part of the issue here is human essentialism. Chimpanzees are less intelligent than the average human, and so are classed into a general category of the second-most-intelligent-ape, as if their variation is totally irrelevant (and for practical day to day purposes it is). Pound for pound chimpanzees are also much stronger than we are. But would anyone be surprised if chimps varied in strength as a function of their genes (controlled for sex)? I doubt it. The issue, if there is one, is that intelligence is perceived as the sine qua non of humanity.
Jason suggests that chimpanzees could serve to explore issues in relation to the development of intelligence and its dependence upon genes and environment. Perhaps, though I think if that is what you want to explore in animal models birds or outbred rodent lineages would be more cost effective. I’m pretty sure they’d exhibit heritable variation in general intelligence as well.
Though obviously there seems to be selection for larger brains in the primate lineage, and perhaps in chordates in general, over hundreds of millions of years, I think it’s a huge step (which I would dispute) to suggest that intelligence itself is evolutionarily favored over shorter time scales (i.e., one can perhaps argue evolutionary success accrues to the brain in a macroevolutionary sense, but far less in a microevolutionary scale of operation). I bet a lot of the evolutionary action is in what cognitive psychologists would term “domain specific cognitive capacities.” E.g., our ability to learn and speak language with complex syntax, which is a human universal. In contrast there may not be that much selection in a directional sense for “domain general cognition.” From a population genetic perspective this would explain why there’s so much heritable variation in intelligence. Strong directional selection tends to purge that variation. The best evidence indicate that most of that variation is due to effects from many genes (on the order of thousands), and I doubt that chimpanzee-human comparative genomics will yield much fruit here.
The jihadi movement in northern Iraq and Syria which is now in the news is wont to put up a black flag. This is a common feature of jihadi movements since at least the year 2000. It’s a phenomenon which has me wondering, because the black flag was the banner of the Abbasids, the second dynasty of caliphs, while most of the jihadi movements take as their inspiration an earlier epoch of pre-dynastic rulers. On the surface this seems a curiosity, but if you read Hugh Kennedy’s When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World you also know that the rise of the Abbasids was driven in part by a deep rage against the earlier Ummayads by the Shia. Some of the Abbasid rulers were in fact relatively sympathetic to the Shia cause, though ultimately the Abbasid period was when what we now think of as Sunni Islam began to crystallize in a coherent positive fashion as something distinct from the sectarian minorities within Islam. All this matters because short term raison d’etre of the Islamic State, and what distinguishes it from Al Qaeda, is that it has put the Shia-Sunni conflict front and center, and the black flag has been associated with Shia movements for over a thousand years now.
To some extent this is trivial. But, it shows the sorts of patterns and connections you can draw upon if you have at your disposal a few seemingly disparate facts. Which brings me the point of this post, a friend asked me via email yesterday what books he should read to understand Islam, and Muslims, a bit more. After 9/11 many Americans went and read the Koran to understand Islam. It’s a relatively short book compared to the Bible, so that’s doable. But it also makes as much sense as reading the New Testament to understand Christianity. If that does make sense to you, and some evangelical Protestants would say that it does, then by all means. But many would argue that you don’t really understand how Christianity as a phenomena manifests itself in the world by just reading the New Testament. But a more appropriate analogy would be reading the Hebrew Bible to understand Judaism. That is because like Judaism, Islam is a religion where much of the intellectual work has gone into defining and extending the body of religious law which regulates life. Judaism as it exists today makes no sense without the Talmud,* which is a far greater body of work in volume than the Bible, and pertains much more precisely to behavior in a day to day sense. Similarly, Islam is much more defined by the Hadith than the Koran in relation to how Muslims live and practice.
Obviously I’m not going to recommend that every non-Muslim read the Hadiths. For practical introductions to Islam John L. Esposito’s oeuvre is probably at the top of the list. Anti-Islamic critics have charged Esposito with being too respectful of his subject of study, but I don’t think that’s a problem as long as you know that going in. After reading Esposito, I would suggest Hugh Kennedy’s two works which introduce Islam’s first two ruling houses, The Great Arab Conquests: How the Spread of Islam Changed the World We Live In and When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World: The Rise and Fall of Islam’s Greatest Dynasty. Like Esposito, Kennedy tends to not directly challenge the standard Islamic narrative, despite not being a Muslim himself. But, one of the central planks of the narrative which has been percolating into the public discourse in the West, and which Kennedy’s works tend to undermine, is the conception that the Sunni-Shia conflict as we understand it today is primal and goes back to the days after the death of Muhammad in the 7th century. Though it may have roots in that period it is quite clear from what I have read that a more precise picture must integrate the centuries of dialogue, debate, and conflict, up until the 10th century, when the Sunni faction as we’d recognize it had emerged. To cap off a survey of traditionalist scholars with a counterpoint, Hagarism: The Making of the Islamic World,** is probably a must. Much of this work is likely wrong, but it is wrong in a very provocative way which makes you reconsider your assumptions. I do think one reality you can take away from this though is that the first century of Islam is an area where we have far less clarity than you might think before exploring the topic. I suspect much of this is due to the fact that our understanding of antiquity is tied to three particular instances of literary reproduction between 800 and 1000, one in the Abbasid House of Wisdom, another during the Carolingian Renaissance, and finally the efforts sponsored by the Byzantine ruler Constantine VII. These translation and copying efforts did have particular agendas, and just the Carolingian scholars would give you a biased picture of post-Roman barbarian states and rulers which preceded the Pippinids, so the Abbasids were not going to commission a view of Islamic history not to their liking.
Finally, to understand mainstream Islamic scholarship which nevertheless attempts to be relevant to Western non-Muslims, you probably need to read Tariq Ramadan. He has the virtues of being an orthodox Sunni who operates with the standard currency of Islam, but still exhibits fluency in the Western conceptual architecture which we take for granted. Additionally he will make up any deficit in metaphysics that one might perceive in the above list of works. Personally I don’t think that religious metaphysics really explain much of interest to those outside a given religious tradition (e.g., Muslims get nothing from understanding Trinitarian theology, and an atheist gains nothing from two hundred ways of defining tawhid), but others disagree.
* Jews who do not root their Judaism in the Talmud, such as Reform Jews, act in opposition and rejection of this tradition, not independent of it.
** If you don’t have access to a college library, there are other revisionist books which are affordable that you can find.
I fancy myself a relatively aware observer of the social scene, but I have to say that the graph to the left startled me somewhat. In less than my lifetime the modal young mother in the United States has gone from being married to unmarried. The effect is ameliorated by the rise in co-habitation, but we have to keep in mind that co-habitation tends to be a looser, and often more ephemeral relationship, than marriage.
But does this matter? I’ve asserted before that families don’t matter as much as you’d think, that marriage is not a panacea for long term social ills which play out in individual lives. Well first, there’s the short term experienced aspect. Even if children can bounce back from a less stable childhood better than you’d think, they still have to experience that instability during many years when they could have been in less stressed circumstances. We’re leaving utility on the table. But the bigger issue is that social statistics are often indicators of deeper underlying dynamics which we perceive but darkly.
Across the political spectrum there are particular and specific panics over a given set of phenomena. Generally conservatives worry about morality and social cohesion, and liberals fret over economic inequality. Though I have personal political views, and suspect that policy can affect change on the margins, I’d be willing to bet broader social dynamics are going to exhibit an internal inertia which all the political theater will not be able to change. The social cohesion which American conservatives yearn for is unlikely to come back due to basic demographics; only 50 percent of births today are to non-Hispanic whites, who themselves are divided by religion, class, and politics. Though some assimilation to a white identity will occur over the long term through intermarriage, in the medium term we’ll have greater multiculturalism. Liberals can change the economic inequality statistic through redistribution, but that doesn’t seem to build up long term human capital. Sweden has reduced poverty and improved the quality of life of immigrants through redistribution, but they remain situated in a social position predicted by their initial human capital (e.g., the children of well educated political refugees from Iran and Chile tend to flourish and assimilate, those of Somali nomads fleeing civil war, not so much).
Where does that leave us? If I had to make a prediction, the American future is going to be more like Brazil. If conservatives are ascendant then there will be attempt to create a myth of national unity to overcome the centrifugal pressures. If liberals are ascendant there will be economic policies to level differences. Likely these two visions will alternate periodically in a stable democracy. But neither will be able to change the reality of a diverse and segregated United States across a variety of metrics.* This isn’t entirely an exotic or novel development, recall the 19th century period of sectionalism.
These data illustrate that reality for me personally. I’m a married “young” father of two in my 30s. I don’t really know people who have children in their early 20s or teens. If you read the full Census report you see that only 1 percent of these women giving birth at a young age have a bachelor’s degree or higher, so that stands to reason. In earlier periods the dynamic above would be sharply racialized in the public imagination, but the data are more nuanced than you’d think. Only 1 percent of these mothers are of Asian background, which one expects. But 43 percent are non-Hispanic white women, not that much lower than the 50 percent of all births. As Charles Murray documents in Coming Apart white America is itself breaking down into its constituent elements, defined by region and class.
As for my children, whose parents are middle class and college educated, the future has bright possibilities. But all the choices I make are going to be geared toward making sure that they are not at the American median, because unlike in decades past that median is not going to be quite so congenial and prosperous. As long as they move in a college educated world where parents are married I’ll be happy, as they can select from an appropriate menu of outcomes which will result in personal flourishing. The key is not to move down in the social pecking order, as therein lies a diminishing of expectations. And this last fact I think explains the panic and frantic aspect of middle class parenting in America today. You always worry that the kids won’t be alright if they aren’t in the top 25%.
* Diversity and segregation not just racially, as we’re wont to think, but economically and socio-politically.
About five years ago when I read Charles Darwins’ The Origin of Species as an adult with some comprehension of biology on a deeper level I was struck by how original and fertile the text was. Years earlier Geoffrey Miller had said in The Mating Mind that it was very useful to read Darwin’s original works, because there is a great deal which doesn’t need to be reinvented. Often Darwin had anticipated many objections, or, his mind had gone down paths which are today very fertile areas of research. I hadn’t thought of that assertion until reading Darwin in the original, but it struck me as exactly right. A few weeks ago I wrote something about species concepts. Well, today I stumbled onto this quote from Origin:
Some few naturalists maintain that animals never present varieties; but then these same naturalists rank the slightest difference as of specific value; and when the same identical form is met with in two distant countries, or in two geological formations, they believe that two distinct species are hidden under the same dress. The term species thus comes to be a mere useless abstraction, implying and assuming a separate act of creation. It is certain that many forms, considered by highly competent judges to be varieties, resemble species so complete in character, that they have been thus ranked by other highly competent judges. But to discuss whether they ought to be called species or varieties, before any definition of these terms has been generally accepted, is vainly to beat the air.
Well played sir! Obviously the context is very different, but some of the arguments are quite general. Darwin was attempting to get to the heart of the matter, and that’s why we remember him and far less the myriad other thinkers of that era.
It’s curious to me that the Coke and Pepsi of America’s print media, The New York Times and The Washington Post, seem to be giving voice to the reality that democracy is not a magic elixir whereby people no longer “suck.” Titled In Myanmar, the Euphoria of Reform Loses Its Glow and U.S. wanted Burma to model democratic change, but it’s not turning out that way, the two pieces highlight the ugly realities of democratic populism. Though these articles are usually bracketed as Muslim-Buddhist conflict, this is only the tip of the iceberg that is the palimpsest of modern Burma.
First, it is important to note that Muslim-Buddhist conflict has several layers. The ethnic cleansing which is occurring to the Rohingya people of Arakan is actually more properly modeled as a racial-ethnic dynamic than a religious one. Physically and linguistically these people are part of the continuum of Bengali populations of South Asia, not the Tibeto-Burman, Tai, and Mon-Khmer peoples of the rest of Burma. Buddhist chauvinists have claimed that this population is a product of the British colonial people, and therefore is not indigenous to Burma, and should be expelled. From what I have gleaned it does seem quite possible, perhaps even likely, that the vast majority of the Rohingya arrived only in the past century or so, from the southeast of Bengal. This does not justify the quasi-exterminationist stance of Buddhists, but it places in proper context the feeling of Buddhist Rakhines of Arakan that they are being dispossessed by aliens. Of course the Rohingya themselves dispute this assertion, attempting to tie themselves to older long settled Muslim populations in Burma. This is an important point, in that in Burma being Muslim does not mean that one is Rohingya. There is a large Muslim population which is ethnically and racially much less distinct from the broader Burmese population, and these are accepted as native to the country. This is why the recent violence in Mandalay can be termed specifically religious, rather than ethnic, because the Muslims of Mandaly differ from the Burmese majority in that city primarily based upon their religion.
The world’s media has noted that Aung San Suu Kyi has been silent or relatively muted on the ethnic and religious violence roiling her country. They have also alluded to the troubling possibility that democratic opening of the country has stoked nationalism and ethnic division. Troubling because the standard Western assumption is that democracy, giving power of the people, is all for the good. But what you see in Burma is that when you give people voice and allow them to organize, sometimes they have a mind of their own. Though the Burmese junta has not been reticent about using conflict in the past to reinforce its rule, it seems unlikely that the neo-liberalizing regime would think that populist chauvinism would be “good for business.” Rather, atavistic popular self-consciousness is being voiced sincerely by the people, the “people” in this case the dominant Theravada Buddhist Bamar majority of the nation. If one is aware of the history of nationalism, and of Burma’s particular history, this phenomenon should not be surprising at all. Mass democracy has been suspiciously correlated with the demand to ‘cleanse’ the nation time & again.
Addendum: Though Burma is relatively diverse, not all diversity is created the same. The Mon people have been the Greeks to the Bamar majority’s role as Romans. As Theravada Buddhists the Mon have been assimilating to Bamar identity over the past few centuries. The Shan of the eastern highlands are ethnic Tai who are relatively late arrivals. But, they converted from Mahayana Buddhism to Theravada. In contrast many Karen and almost all the Kachin are Christian, which alienates them from the Bamar. Finally, you have the case of the Rohingya, who are not only religiously distinct, but are racially very different from the other Burmese ethnic groups, explaining their role as the most extreme pariahs in modern Burma.
Peter Heather’s The Restoration of Rome: Barbarian Popes and Imperial Pretenders is far inferior to his two earlier books, The Fall of the Roman Empire: A New History of Rome and the Barbarians and Empires and Barbarians: The Fall of Rome and the Birth of Europe. The substantive problem is that unlike the first two works this capstone of his scholarly trilogy lacks focus and coherency. There isn’t a very strong story threading together the disparate elements. The restoration of Rome that Heather alludes to in the title is the Papacy of the high medieval period, after 1200 or so. His story then has tie together Theodoric’s dominion in 6th century Italy, as well as Justinian’s Byzantium, and the long period between the rise of Islam and the Crusades. Because of considerations of space there are enormous lacunae in the book, as it is basically a history of aspects of late antiquity which bleeds over into the middle ages. A minor stylistic demerit The Restoration of Rome which I also found grating was the use of British English idiom in some passages. I have to go to online dictionaries to understand some allusions and references, and I wonder what I may have missed. Luckily I’ve already transitioned to reading Azar Gat’s Nations, which seems a more substantive and well thought out book.
Of course there are elements of Heather’s new book which are interesting or useful in attempting to understand general historical and cultural principles. For example, he presents a good deal of information which suggests that medieval forgeries such as the Donation of Constantine were written not in Rome for the Popes, but rather in northern Europe for local bishops. Eventually these documents were leveraged in the ideological program of the high medieval Papacy, but that was a downstream consequence of genuinely local exigencies which triggered these productions. No doubt this specific case illustrates general dynamic.